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4.1  Introduction 
The Single European Act of  1985, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 
and the current talks among the United States, Canada, and Mexico may signal 
the beginning of a sea change in international trade policies. Government deci- 
sions to form larger trading blocs have been construed by many as a precursor 
to the return of trade warfare that dominated international trade in the 1930s. 
Just as the absence of international leadership in the interwar period produced 
trade rivalry among nations and intense competition for markets, so too have 
there been fears that the tripolar world of  the  1990s will be too unstable to 
promote freer trade. In this context, the momentum created by Europe’s 1992 
program and North America’s free trade zone could have severe consequences 
for Japan and East Asia. 
There is a political as well as an economic logic for believing that the 1990s 
will produce fortresses in Europe and North America. On the political front, 
the declining competitiveness of the United States and many European nations 
has produced increasing pressure to protect industry and employment. In the 
absence of a hegemon, the countervailing forces for free trade may be difficult 
to find. These political arguments become reinforced by the economics of bloc 
formation. Medium and small countries have never made a pretense of becorn- 
ing self-sufficient: it makes little sense for Luxembourg or Canada to produce 
its own brands of airplanes and cars. Once small countries become part of  a 
larger economic bloc, however, domestic production becomes more feasible in 
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many industries. Therefore, it is often argued that, as trading blocs grow larger, 
the potential benefits of protectionism rise. 
This paper explores the underlying incentives for protectionism in a world 
with economic blocs, and the consequences for trade, investment, and competi- 
tion with Japan and East Asia. We argue that the incentives for protection vary 
by the type of industry: in traditional  sectors not characterized by increasing 
returns, protectionism may not be appealing in large trading blocs. We suggest 
that, over time, trade bamers may even fall. Our logic is that factors of produc- 
tion, especially capital, are increasingly mobile. In industries without strong 
increasing returns, efficient production is possible in a variety of locations. As 
a consequence, any effort by one region to raise taxes will lead firms to estab- 
lish operations abroad. As long as barriers to exit for capital are low, firms will 
seek to exploit lower-cost locations that take advantage of other large markets. 
Exit by domestic firms (as well as the possibility of inward investment by for- 
eign firms) weakens the political case and the political coalition for protection 
in the long run. Much of the outward investment should benefit low wage but 
high productivity countries in East Asia, such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Malaysia, and so forth. 
High-technology  industries, with increasing returns, offer a different pic- 
ture. We argue that the emergence of regional trading blocs is more likely to 
produce an increase in trade restrictions in sectors characterized by large fixed 
costs in R&D, manufacturing scale economies, and/or steep learning curves. 
For these industries, there is not only a coherent case for import protection (to 
help promote exports as well as preserve the domestic market), but that case 
becomes even stronger as trading blocs emerge and grow. 
Finally, we draw some implications from the model. One of  the strongest 
findings is that there is a disjuncture between trade policies and investment 
policies, in both academic models and the real world. The mobility of capital 
undermines  many  of  our precious  assumptions about how  trade policy and 
trade politics  are supposed to work. Moreover,  if  our arguments are robust, 
they suggest some significant  dangers for the future. Cross-investments  be- 
tween North America and Europe will undermine many of the forces for isola- 
tionism and protectionism in the long run only if cross-investment is symmetri- 
cal, that is, firms from all major regions invest in each others’ territory. To date, 
however, cross-investment has  been  asymmetrical:  European  and Japanese 
firms have invested heavily  in America; American and Japanese  firms have 
invested heavily in Europe; but no significant American and European invest- 
ment has gone to Japan. 
If Japan remains reserved for the Japanese, incentives for strategic trade pol- 
icy will continue in Japan, creating further trade tensions. Moreover, asymmet- 
ric access to Japan’s markets could alter the structure of competition in the rest 
of Asia. Using the logic of our model, there are incentives for Japan to create 
a de facto trade bloc, at least for increasing returns sectors, that extends beyond 127  Trading Blocs and the Incentives to Protect 
the borders of Japan to the rest of East Asia. If European and North American 
firms lack (or even believe that they lack) trade and investment access to a 
larger East Asian trading bloc, the asymmetry between North American and 
Japanese firms in increasing returns industries could grow.  The rational re- 
sponse for American and European firms might then be to prevent the creation 
of  an even larger East Asian trading bloc by  actively countering Japanese 
expansion in East Asia. 
The paper is in four sections. Following this introduction, we construct a 
simple model of  trade in industries that do not exhibit global economies of 
scale. In section 4.2, we  show how static and dynamic forces for and against 
protectionism can interact. We conclude that the long-run outlook is optimistic 
for free trade in these sectors, even in a world with one or two trading blocs. 
Next, we extend the model to “battlefield” sectors like semiconductors, where 
increasing returns are critical. Here we argue that the temptation to use strate- 
gic trade policies will grow along with trading bloc size. Because the critical 
factors of production are not as mobile in the short run as industries with in- 
creasing returns, direct investment will not have the same effects, at least in 
the medium term. Only over the long run will direct investment produce similar 
results. We  use brief illustrations of trade in semiconductors to illuminate the 
increasing returns part of the model. 
In drawing implications from the model, we present a brief case study of 
competition in telecommunications equipment in East Asia. The combination 
of fear and frustration-fear  of the long-term competitive strength of Japanese 
companies, and frustration over lack of access to the Japanese telecommunica- 
tions market-have  led firms such as AT&T to fight aggressively Japanese 
firms in East Asia to prevent a de fact0 trading bloc from emerging. Although 
the evidence is still anecdotal, it could suggest that East Asia-not  Japan- 
may become the next battleground outside of North America and Europe for 
East-West competition in high-technology products. 
4.2  A Model of Protection among Trading Blocs 
Here we  study how the formation of  trading blocs affects strategic trade 
incentives for goods not subject to increasing returns in production. For these 
purposes, we adapt a simple model used first by Gros (1987) and developed in 
more detail by  Krugman (199 1  b). 
Imagine that the world is composed of  N countries or distinct economic 
regions. Each of the N  regions has its own variety of indigenous good, which 
is produced locally (and potentially abroad) and which may be sold to other 
regions. These regions are divided among B  trading blocs. We  assume that 
each bloc represents a “common” market within which goods and factors move 
freely. For simplicity we assume that all B  blocs are symmetric, that is, that 
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The consumers of all regions are exactly alike, in that they share the same 
preferences for goods produced locally as well as those produced in other re- 
gions. Again, for simplicity, we assume that their utility is of the form 
where C, is an individual’s consumption of region i’s good. The symmetry of 
the model implies that the elasticity of substitution between any two goods is 
given by u  = 1/(1 -  0),  with 0 5 O < I. The higher is u the greater is the 
substitutability of goods in consumption. 
We also assume that, while goods move freely within the confines of each 
trading bloc, the domestic (intrabloc) market may be protected by levying im- 
port  tariffs  or export taxes. As long as goods are not perfect  substitutes in 
consumption (which would be the case were O = l),  blocs will favor some type 
of protection at their common border. In our model, this protection takes the 
form of an optimal export tax. From the optimal tariff literature, we know that 
the optimal (ad valorem) export tax is given by 
where E  is the elasticity of the rest of the world’s demand for a bloc’s exports. 
We  assume that each bloc sets its own external taxes or tariffs  in isolation, 
treating other blocs’ tax rates as fixed; that is, we assume that tariffs are set in 
a Nash bargaining process. 
There is a great deal of literature on the desirability of trading blocs-typi- 
cally called “customs unions” in the parlance of international trade. Much of 
this literature is concerned with the question of whether such blocs could ever 
be in participating countries’ interests. By eliminating trade restrictions with 
one set of countries but maintaining restrictions with others, some of the newly 
created intrabloc trade is welfare-improving because it involves the expansion 
of efficient producers, but some of the new trade is welfare-reducing because 
it expands the production of firms that  are inefficient  by  international stan- 
dards. However, the positive effects of “trade creation” must dominate the neg- 
ative effects of “trade diversion” as long as the trading bloc as a whole sets its 
external barriers optimally.  I  Thus, trading blocs naturally emerge in the above 
model, since bloc formation is in the individual interest of participating coun- 
tries (although countries would be better off if all external barriers were com- 
pletely removed). 
There are two empirical difficulties with the theoretical proposition that pro- 
tection improves a customs union’s welfare. The first (and easiest to dismiss) 
is that protection rarely takes the form of an export tax, the type of trade barrier 
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described by  equation (2). However, it should be noted that export taxes are 
used here for convenience only. In our model-as  in many general equilibrium 
models with  balanced  trade-export  taxes are equivalent to import tariffs, 
(Tariffs and export taxes discourage both imports and exports because both 
raise domestic prices of goods and factors relative to those on the world mar- 
ket.) This means that all of our results below hold when tariffs are used instead 
of export taxes. 
A second, more telling objection to this model concerns the motivation for 
imposing protection in the first place. Here the assumption is that protection 
can improve a country’s terms of trade: tariffs lower the world price of its im- 
ports, and export taxes raise the world price of its exports. Yet in the real world, 
these kinds of  optimal-tariff arguments are often not the motivation behind 
the erection of trade barriers. Occasionally, countries impose trade barriers to 
capture gains from increasing returns to scale-the  subject of  the model in 
section 4.2.1 (see also Milner and Yoffie 1989). In most cases, however, gov- 
ernments use protection as a means of transferring resources to factors that are 
inefficient by  international standards (Aggarwal, Keohane, and Yoffie  1987). 
Often these transfers are not the result of some kind of market failure in which 
there is a wedge between social and private returns that domestic protection 
altogether removes. 
Despite these caveats, we believe that the Gros-Krugman model has rele- 
vance to the political economy of protection when economic blocs form. One 
of  the great fears of  “fortress Europe,” for example, is that  some export- 
oriented producers, like Italian footwear firms, makers of Belgian chocolate, 
and British banks, would prefer to have a larger Europe to themselves. Whether 
or not protection for such sectors can be justified on the basis of  increasing 
returns is unclear. But it is clear that much of the 1992 debate is about making 
the benefits of  the customs union available exclusively to local factors (and 
not to foreign factors). And this is just another way  of  phrasing the optimal 
tariff argument. 
The absence of globally increasing returns is important in the model of this 
section because the model implies that protection hurts competitiveness, that 
is, that protection leads to a diminution, not an expansion, of interblock trade. 
The way that the domestic bloc benefits from imposing common external trade 
barriers is to limit its sales on international markets. This need no longer be 
true if the trade barriers are put in place to protect firms with globally increas- 
ing returns to scale. If, for example, the marginal costs of an import-competing 
firm fall fast enough as output increases, then tariffs may  actually enhance 
international competitiveness: by protecting domestic production and assuring 
a domestic market base, the domestic producer may end up with lower costs 
in terms of world prices, so that its exports become more competitive.* The 
2. For a series of  models exhibiting these features, see Krugman (1991a). 130  Kenneth A. Froot and David B. Yoffie 
implicit guarantee of domestic market share may lower total costs even though 
import protection tends to raise factor prices. We  investigate the implications 
of increasing returns in section 4.2.1. 
Thus far, we have not addressed the issue of whether government taxation 
of trade creates an incentive to locate production elsewhere. Consider, for ex- 
ample, the case of an import tariff. By raising domestic production of import- 
competing goods, tariffs tend to siphon factors of  production out of  export 
sectors and to drive up their costs. The corresponding erosion in international 
competitiveness may  be  offset  through  relocating  production  of  exports 
abroad. The argument for producing abroad is even more direct in the case of 
an explicit export tax. Either way, protection may lead firms to reconsider their 
production-location decisions. 
However, firm location decisions are usually moot in standard models of 
trade policy. Domestic “firms” produce local goods only locally. Firms do not 
consider relocation, and as a result, governments do not need to take relocation 
decisions into account in determining desired trade barriers. These assump- 
tions are probably not very accurate-few  Fortune 500 firms produce exclu- 
sively in the United States, and many have more than half of their labor force 
employed outside that country. Economists usually do not worry so much about 
the accuracy of the domestic-production assumption, but here we might expect 
firm location decisions to interact with the level of protection, especially when 
the world becomes dominated by a few trading blocs. 
When blocs levy taxes on their own exports, exporting firms may find that 
they have a greater incentive to locate certain activities abroad. To be more 
precise, note that, on units to be sold abroad, each unit that is also produced 
abroad does not have to pay  the export tax. Firms therefore receive (1 + T) 
times as much on foreign sales produced abroad as they do on exported sales, 
where T is the ad valorem export tax. As a consequence, domestic firms have 
an incentive to shift toward foreign-based production as long as the marginal 
cost of  production abroad is less than (1 + T)  times as great as the marginal 
cost of domestic production. This leads to an equilibrium condition: 
(3) 
where MC, and MC,, are marginal cost of production abroad and at home, and 
q, and qh are the quantities produced abroad and at home, respectively. We 
assume that qa is less than the quantity consumed by foreign residents, that is, 
that some domestic production for export always takes place. As long as we 
have such an interior solution, equation (3) holds, and it yields a condition on 
the share of firm production that is done overseas. 
Equation (3) holds only for “interior” levels of production. That is, it may 
be that marginal costs of production at home are much lower than those abroad, 
in which case all production will take place domestically, and equation (3) will 
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productive facility, so that even if  marginal costs make overseas production 
attractive, firms may  not produce abroad. Nevertheless, in what follows we 
presume that equation (3) holds, that we are not at a “corner” equilibrium. 
Equation (3) should be thought of  as applying to each productive location 
abroad. To  simplify matters, suppose that firms treat production within each 
foreign bloc as an alternative to exports to that bloc. (This rules out locating in 
one foreign bloc as a means of exporting to others, which in any case would 
be economically inefficient in the equilibrium of  the model. Because such 
foreign-produced exports would be subject to the foreign bloc’s export tax, 
there would be no incentive for firms to locate export production overseas in 
the first place.) 
In order for equation (3) to be operationally useful, we need to make some 
assumptions about how  the ratio of  marginal costs on the left-hand side be- 
haves. In order to satisfy equation (3), the left-hand side must be locally in- 
creasing in q, or decreasing in q,,; we cannot have an equilibrium in location 
of production if by exporting one unit fewer and producing it abroad, a com- 
pany could lower its total costs of production and increase its incentive to pro- 
duce even more units abroad. Perhaps the simplest assumption is that marginal 
costs of home production are a constant (represented by  ci >  0), and that for- 
eign marginal costs increase above the home level as output rises (represented 
by  ci + pqo, with p >  0). Equation (3) then has the form 
(4) 
which  implies that production in each of  the  (B -  1) foreign blocs is q, = 
db, where  b = p/a. It  follows that  total production  abroad  is  given  by 
This expression for production abroad is useful in several ways. First, it as- 
sumes that the marginal cost of  production at home is always less than that 
abroad. This means that firms locate abroad only to avoid domestic taxation 
(relaxing this assumption is likely to strengthen the results below), and other- 
wise have a preference for domestic production. Second, by letting the parame- 
ter b vary with the number of blocs, we have  an easy way  of  incorporating 
scale effects into the model, even while retaining local decreasing returns. For 
example, when the world trading system is fragmented into many blocs of 
small size, blocs may be too small to merit firms establishing separate opera- 
tions in each. In such a case, we might expect relatively little (and perhaps no) 
production in each small foreign bloc (i.e., b is large). Alternatively, when 
there are few blocs, each of large size, marginal costs for large foreign opera- 
tions might be expected to be close to those for home production (i.e., b is 
small). 
To incorporate this latter notion simply, we let b = B -  1, so that overseas 
production of each region’s product is simply Q, = T. (If the incentives to pro- 
duce abroad are stronger as bloc size grows, then we could let b = (B -  1)9 
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so that overseas production is increasing in the size of blocs, Q,  = d(B -  I).) 
Since there are NIB regions in each bloc, the total amount of  a given bloc's 
product that is produced locally in the rest of the world is 
Next we need to determine the optimal tax for each bloc. Following Krugman 
(1991b), we normalize each region's volume of output to equal 1. This implies 
that a representative bloc's output is Y = NIB and that output in the rest of the 
world is Y"'"  = N(l -  B-I). If  trade is balanced, then rest-of-world demand 
must equal rest-of-world output. Rest-of-world demand is spent on goods pro- 
duced domestically, D"",  goods exported from our bloc, Mow,  and overseas 
production of our goods, Cow.  Therefore, 
(6) 
where p is the relative price (in rest-of-world prices) of goods from our bloc. 
In this setting, unlike in standard models, the "optimal" export tax is, in a 
sense, a question of political economy. Usually it is assumed that both produc- 
tion and ownership of  the domestic firm are entirely domestic. This leads to 
the presumption that an improvement in the terms of trade will be reaped only 
by domestic residents, workers, and capital providers. Even if this presumption 
is not realistic, it is consistent with the structure of the traditional model. 
Once the foreign firm employs foreign factors of production, however, it is 
no longer immediately clear that domestic factors will receive all of the bene- 
fits of protection. There is likely to be some leakage to foreign factors. That is, 
these foreign factors may be able to extract some of the benefits of the domestic 
good's higher price on world markets. Clearly, domestic residents cannot bene- 
fit from a tax or tariff to the extent that its proceeds are transferred to foreign- 
ers. And if the government is concerned only with domestic residents' welfare, 
then leakage to foreigners will affect its choice of an optimal tax or tariff. In 
the present model, the portion of production that is located abroad avoids the 
export tax. Therefore the firm, not the domestic government, must distribute 
some of the tax revenues, both in the form of higher marginal costs and in the 
form of profits. 
To keep things simple, we consider two types of revenue distribution by the 
firm. The first is the traditional case in which all tax-generated revenues (i.e., 
the additional firm revenues earned by moving production abroad) are returned 
to domestic factors. This assumption is probably not very reasonable in a world 
in which firms have  international work forces and equity holders. But it is 
useful because it parallels the assumption in the standard model that all reve- 
nue gains accrue to domestic residents. This case might also be thought of as 
a kind of "short-run" optimal tax. When first moving abroad, domestic firms 
may be able to keep most of the excess revenues for domestic residents. But 
over time, as the firm becomes more international in character, foreign factors 
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of production may become more able to extract excess revenues from their 
 employer^.^ Thus, our short-run optimal tariff treats the leakage to foreigners 
as unimportant. 
The other case-which  we will call the "long-run''  optimal tariff-is  where 
the government considers only those revenues that are actually collected at the 
border as benefiting domestic residents. This would occur if the lost tax reve- 
nues accrue entirely to foreigners, which as mentioned above is more likely to 
occur over time. The distinction we are drawing here between short- and long- 
run is obviously extreme; neither is very realistic. But our goal is to strike a 
balance between positive and normative theories of commercial policy. Thus, 
while governments' actual commercial-policy objectives may remain unclear, 
the optimal tariff may nevertheless be changing over time, as the benefits of 
protection are increasingly lost to foreign factors of production. 
Once we accept this distinction between short- and long-run taxes, it is 
straightforward to derive their optimal levels. Since in the short run we assume 
that governments ignore the distinction between L"" and Ww,  we can simply 
take logs and then derivatives of the terms in equation (6): 
(7) 
where Fro" = L"" + Ww  is total  sales to foreigners, circumflexes over the 
variables  denote  log  derivatives,  brow  = dn(Dow)  = dPw/Pw,  and  f= 
(Cow  + Mow)/Pw  is the share of our bloc's goods in rest-of-world consumption. 
Equation (7) tells us that the elasticity of foreign demand for our bloc's goods is 
(1 -  fib"  + f(j  +  PO") = i. = 0, 
F"" 
prow  1  = -(f+  (1 -flu). 
Using equations (8) and (2),  the optimal short-run tax is given by 
(9) 
1  .y = 
(1 -  fl(a - 1)' 
Equation (9) says that the optimal tariff is a function of the substitutability 
of domestic and foreign goods, and of the share.of domestic goods in rest-of- 
world expenditure. The more substitutable are the goods (the higher is a),  the 
less there is room to extract rents, and the lower is the optimal tariff. Also, the 
tariff becomes smaller as share of domestic goods in foreigners' consumption 
falls. Note, however, that even if  the domestic bloc is "small"  (i.e., iff = 0), 
the optimal tariff is positive: there is still some monopoly power created by  the 
imperfect substitutability among goods. 
In the longer run, the government's perceived elasticity of substitution be- 
tween domestic and foreign goods is not given by  equation (9). The govern- 
3. Porter (1990) suggests that workers ultimately are able to extract compensation gains from 
successful companies. That is, even if a firm can succeed in raising the price at which its product 
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ment recognizes that a tax increase stimulates additional overseas production, 
eroding the export-tax base. Thus equation (6) becomes 
(10) 
where  1 = Cow/(Cow  + Mow)  is the share of  overseas production in  rest-of- 
world consumption of our bloc's  goods. 
Next we need to know how overseas production is affected by  a change in 
relative prices. First, note that, since p = 1 + T, it  follows that  percentage 
changes in prices and tariffs are related by 
(1 -  f>6mw + fie + lirow + (1 -  1)Ejlrow) = P = 0, 
Second, from equations (5) and (1  1)  the percentage change in overseas produc- 
tion for a given percentage change in relative prices is given by 
Combining equations (10) and (12), we  have that the long-run elasticity of 
substitution is 
A little algebra yields that the optimal long-run tax is given by 
__~.  1-1  = 
(1 -f)(u - 1) + 21 
Equation (14) is similar to (9), except that (14) is a decreasing function of  1. 
This says that, as the foreign-produced share of  the domestic good rises, the 
optimal long-run tariff falls. If  1 reaches one, so that all of the domestic good 
is produced abroad, the optimal tariff falls to zero. 
In order to understand how these taxes move in equilibrium, we  must first 
determine the consumption and production shares,fand 1.  Following Krugman 
(1991b) we note that, at world prices, a representative bloc's expenditure must 
equal its output, 
(15)  D+M+L=I: 
and the representative bloc's output is in turn 
N  y=- 
B' 
Each  of  the  other (B -  1) blocs  sells a total volume  of  (M + L)/(B -  1) 
(expressed in  world  prices)  to  the  representative bloc;  the  ratio  of  these 
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(M +L)/D(B -  1). The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function 
then implies that this ratio is equal to the relative price of foreign to domestic 
goods, adjusted for the elasticity of substitution, (M + L)/D(B - 1) =  p-". 
Substituting, this yields 
Using equation (17) and the definition of$ we have that the share of rest-of- 
world expenditure that falls on domestic goods is 
To determine the foreign-produced share of domestic goods consumed by for- 
eigners, note that 1 can be written 
where we have used equations (5) and (16) to get the last expression on the 
right-hand side. 
Equations (18) and (19) together with an expression for the optimal tariff 
(either equation  [9] or [14]) allow us to understand how optimal taxes are 
affected by changes in the number of trading blocs. Let us begin with the short- 
run tax,  T~'. Here equations (9) and (18)  are all that matter (the fraction of 
output produced abroad, 1,  has no effect on either equation). Figure 4.1 shows 
the equilibrium. On the horizontal axis is the level of the tax, T~',  and on the 
vertical axis is $ the fraction of the domestic bloc's  goods in rest-of-world 
expenditure. The curve marked TT  shows the trade-off between f and r given 
by equation (9). The curve is an increasing function of$  as the expenditure 
r' 
Fig. 4.1  The optimal short-run export tax 
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Fig. 4.2 
tax 
The effect of an increase in bloc size on the optimal short-run export 
share of domestic goods increases, the domestic bloc’s monopoly power also 
increases. The other curve, marked FF:  is given by  equation (18). It shows 
that, all else equal, an increase in the tax encourages foreigners to substitute 
consumption away from domestic products, leading to a decline in$ 
Figure 4.2 shows what happens to the optimal tariff as the number of blocs 
falls. The T T curve does not shift, since the optimal tax is a function only of 
a bloc’s importance in foreigners’ consumption,j and not of the number of 
blocks, B. However, the FF curve in equation (1  8) shifts outward as the number 
of blocs falls: with fewer blocs, each bloc has a greater share in others’ con- 
sumption at the preexisting tax rate. In equilibrium, the optimal short-run tax 
increases to reflect this higher degree of monopoly power. This simple model 
therefore suggests that protectionism rises as trading blocs become larger. 
To see what is driving this result, ask why it is that, for any given number of 
trading blocs, governments are unwilling to raise taxes to even higher levels. 
The model’s  answer is that foreigners shift their consumption away from the 
domestic bloc’s goods, reducing exports. That is, substitution in foreign con- 
sumption disciplines a bloc’s ability to tax its own industries. 
Now let us turn to the long-run tariff. The equilibrium here is described by 
equations (14), (18), and (19). These three equations are graphed in figure 4.3. 
The top panel shows the trade-off between j  the share of domestic goods in 
rest-of-world expenditure, and the long-run tax, T.  These two curves are similar 
to those shown in figures 4.1 and 4.2. In the bottom panel of  figure 4.3, the 
relationship between I, the share of  sales to the rest-of-world that is produced 
abroad, and T is depicted. Note that the T T curve here is downward sloping: 
an increase in the share of  overseas production reduces the domestic govem- 
ment’s tax base, and limits the effectiveness of  an export tax. At the margin 
this makes export taxes less worthwhile. On the other hand, the 1 schedule is 137  Trading Blocs and the Incentives to Protect 
upward sloping: an increase in the domestic tax induces domestic producers to 
locate more of their production abroad. The optimal long-run tax is determined 
both by the short-run substitutability of consumption by foreigners and by the 
long-run substitutability of where production is located. 
What happens to the optimal long-run tax as the size of the representative 
trading bloc increases? To clarify the effect that production-location decisions 
have  on optimal taxes, consider the case in which goods are not very close 
substitutes, u = 1. (This implies that preferences are Cobb-Douglas, so that 
given B,  a fixed share of  income is spent on each region's  good.) Figure 4.4 
demonstrates what happens. With u  = 1, equation (14) becomes 
1-1 
21  ' 
=  ~  (14') 
L  \  T 
7 
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Fig. 4.4  The effect of an increase in bloc size on the optimal long-run export 
tax 
which is a function only of 1.  By setting u = 1, the sole cost of raising export 
taxes is that production moves abroad. Thus, when the number of trading blocs 
falls, the T T curve in the bottom panel of figure 4.4 does not shift. 
When u = 1, equation ( 18) becomes 
1  f=7+B9 
which implies that equation (19) can be written 
T(T + B)  !=- 
B-1 ' 
Equation (19') says that a decrease in the number of  blocs makes firms more 
willing to establish production abroad, which in turn makes the domestic gov- 139  Trading Blocs and the Incentives to Protect 
ernment less willing to levy export taxes. This effect is captured by  a shift 
outward in the LL curve in the bottom panel of figure 4.4. Thus, as the figure 
shows, the optimal long-run tax falh as the representative bloc increases in 
size. 
Why is it that bigger bloc size implies a lower optimal long-run tax but a 
higher optimal short-run tax? Recall that the short-run tax increases because, 
when domestic goods are a larger share of foreign consumption, it becomes 
possible for the domestic government to extract more monopoly rents from 
foreign consumers. In  the case of  the long-run tax, we  can for the moment 
suppress this effect: setting u  = 1 neutralizes the effect of bloc size on the 
monopoly power that a bloc’s government has. Once we have suppressed the 
effects of substitution in consumption, the sole long-run effect is that created 
by  substitution in production location. In  the long run, firms have  a greater 
incentive to locate abroad when foreign blocs are big, since bigger bloc size 
permits overseas production on a more efficient scale. The greater is the elas- 
ticity of substitution in production location, the lower is the tax that the govern- 
ment is willing to levy. 
Of  course, if  we  allow goods to  be better substitutes for one another (by 
setting u  > l),  then the long-run tax will be determined by both forces: substi- 
tutability in consumption as well as substitutability in production. If  bigger 
blocs lead to greater monopoly power in consumption, but to smaller monop- 
oly power in firm-location choice, then the ultimate effect of  bigger blocs on 
protection is ambiguous. However, the long-run tax will consistently be lower 
than the short-run tax. 
This model therefore suggests that there are conflicting forces at work when 
trading blocs form or increase their size. On the one hand, there is a temptation 
to protect domestic producers from charging “too low” a price for their ex- 
ports. This tends to keep external taxes high. On the other hand, the possibility 
of foreign direct investment helps to minimize how much the government gives 
in to protectionist temptations. Government interference in the best interest of 
the country (or of the export industry) is not necessarily in the best interest 
of  each firm. Firms have a private incentive to avoid direct and indirect costs 
of protection. When firms can respond to this incentive, effective taxation re- 
mains low as trading bloc governments compete with one another to attract 
domestic production. 
As always, it is best to think of the results from this model as suggestive. 
The forces that determine the optimal levels of protection discussed above do 
not provide a satisfactory description of the motivation behind many commer- 
cial policies. In practice, governments that impose protection (as well as indus- 
tries that lobby for it) often do so in the name of promoting international com- 
petitiveness, not  discouraging  competitiveness, as  standard  optimal  tariff 
arguments would have it. Regardless of the motivation, the general equilibrium 
effects of protection are clear: it raises the relative costs of domestic factors 140  Kenneth A. Froot and David B. Yoffie 
and therefore makes local production less competitive internationally.  This cre- 
ates the incentive to produce local goods with less expensive foreign factors. 
Countries that want to keep the cost of domestic factors down and domestic 
production for exports will have to avoid protectionist policies. 
The economics of  industries with increasing returns suggests a different 
rationale for protection, one that may  represent a closer parallel to the real 
world. Through protection, firms may  realize lower costs of  production and 
therefore become more internationally competitive. We  therefore turn to the 
effects of tripolarity on protection of increasing returns sectors. 
4.3  Increasing Returns and Trading Blocs 
Politicians and businessmen have  long argued that  a protected domestic 
market enhances international competitiveness. Traditionally, they based their 
arguments on the “infant industry” notion, which says that domestic market 
imperfections lower private (but not social) returns in new industries, and that 
these imperfections are best dealt with through trade restrictions. Among econ- 
omists, however, the infant industry argument receives little support. While 
many economists accept the existence of  market imperfections (incomplete 
capital markets, lack of complete appropriability of R&D, externalities in pro- 
duction, etc.), nearly all reject the idea that trade restrictions can be a first-best 
means of correction. 
More recently, strategic trade theory has offered a better rationale for using 
protection as a means of helping domestic industries. With imperfect competi- 
tion among firms, protectionist policies can alter foreign competitors’ beliefs 
about the domestic firm’s strategic behavior. Sometimes (though not always) it 
is possible to use government policies-trade  restrictions in particular-to  tip 
the equilibrium outcome not only in favor of domestic firms, but also in favor 
of the domestic economy as a whole. Trade policies may be a device for con- 
veying credibly the future aggressiveness of domestic firms, which in turn may 
make foreign firms less aggressive. 
For the whole economy to benefit, trade restrictions must create sufficient 
improvements in the efficiency of the productive sector to offset what would 
otherwise be an increase in the price paid by  domestic consumers (as well as 
any tendency to “crowd out” other types of domestic production). Thus, it is 
necessary that some kind of economies of  scale, either static or  dynamic, be 
present. We  show below that larger domestic markets help leverage the effects 
of increasing returns. That is, a larger domestic market can enhance the domes- 
tic government’s ability to capitalize on the benefits from import protection. 
These forces suggest that protectionism should be even greater in these sectors 
when blocs are large compared to when the national markets are small. 
Imagine that there are N firms that share the world market for a product, say 
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N 
p  = a -  Cqi  = a -  Q, 
where p is the price of chips and qi is the output of the ith firm. Suppose that 
each firm chooses its output in order to maximize profits, setting marginal 
revenues equal to marginal costs. This implies the standard equilibrium condi- 
tion for profit maximization: 
i=  I 
(20) 
p  1 -r = MC,,  (  1) 
P~Q 
Q~P 
where s, = q,/Q,  the ith firm’s share of the total market for chips; E = -,  the 
elasticity of demand for chips; and MC,  is the ith firm’s marginal costs of pro- 
duction. From this setup it is straightforward to show that the ith firm’s output 
is given by 
What happens if the domestic market is protected so that only the domestic 
firm can sell there? If  there are no increasing returns (so that marginal costs 
remain the same once the protection is put in place), then the domestic firm’s 
foreign market share remains the same in the short run. All that changes is its 
share of the domestic market. Under these circumstances, protection is likely 
to be bad for the domestic bloc as a whole: the domestic market for chips 
becomes less competitive, which hurts domestic consumers more than it helps 
domestic producers. 
If there are increasing returns to scale, however, the domestic economy can 
benefit from protection. Increasing returns may take several forms, including 
dynamic effects such as learning by doing and the proliferation of  new tech- 
niques. For our purposes, however, static increasing returns (in the form of 
decreasing marginal costs) have the same overall impact as these more com- 
plex dynamic effects. 
Suppose, then, that marginal costs decline as output increases. This implies 
that, as the domestic market for chips becomes more efficient, domestic firms 
expand their foreign market share. In this situation protection is much more 
likely to make the domestic bloc better off. To see the effects on output, take 
equation (22)  as a description of the domestic firm’s foreign sales. When the 
domestic market is protected, the domestic firm’s output rises and so its mar- 
ginal costs fall (i.e., MC, declines). This has a direct, positive effect on the 
domestic firm’s foreign sales, raising its foreign market share. 
There are also several strategic effects of the protectionist policy, which may 
be even more powerful than the direct effects. First, other firms reduce the 
absolute amount of their output in foreign markets, in deference to the lower 
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as MC,, j # i, declines. But a foreign output reduction further spills over into 
higherforeign marginal costs, reducing foreign output even further. Finally, as 
equation (22) shows, higher foreign marginal costs directly raise the domestic 
firm’s output. This then begins the cycle again, further raising domestic mar- 
ginal costs and output, and lowering further foreign marginal costs and output. 
Once we arrive at a new equilibrium-at  which point equation (22) is satisfied 
for all N firms-protection  of  the domestic market will have been translated 
into a competitive advantage for the domestic firm in its foreign markets as 
well. The greater the increasing returns, the greater is the spillover effect onto 
export competitiveness. 
Clearly, these strategic effects are important beyond the large size of a do- 
mestic bloc. In larger blocs, domestic protectionist policies have a greater im- 
pact OI!  the strategic outcomes abroad. Indeed, the domestic welfare conse- 
quences of  protection depend importantly on how much marginal costs fall. 
All else equal, a larger domestic market makes it more likely that marginal 
costs fall substantially, and that the domestic firm gains a large strategic advan- 
tage  in  overseas markets. The greater the  decrease in  marginal costs, the 
greater the chance that the domestic bloc as a whole will benefit from the pro- 
tection. The implication is that larger blocs have greater incentives to initiate 
strategic protectionism designed to take advantage of increasing returns. 
Is the possibility of foreign direct investment likely to reverse this tendency 
toward greater protectionism, as it did in section 4.2? The answer partly lies in 
whether firms are willing to transfer abroad that part of the operations that is 
subject to increasing returns. Activities such as R&D, product development 
and design, and the actual production of new generation products may have the 
greatest increasing returns associated with them. Yet  these activities may be 
the least likely candidates to be moved abroad-at  least in the short to medium 
run. Production activities that are not associated with important increasing re- 
turns  are probably  better candidates for overseas production, to which the 
model of the previous section applies. 
The modem semiconductor industry provides a good illustration of how this 
model might work in reality. Semiconductors is a relatively new industry, be- 
gun in 1959 with the invention of the integrated circuit (IC). Initially the indus- 
try had relatively low entry costs and only moderate scale economies (Intel 
Corporation built a state-of-the-art fabrication facility in  1972 for $3.2 mil- 
lion). Even R&D scale was modest: it was common for a few engineers with a 
good idea to design a new product. Most firms in the United States, Japan, and 
Europe built their manufacturing fabrication facilities in their home bases, but 
since transportation costs were insignificant,  assembly and test operations were 
often moved to low-cost-labor locations. 
In the mid-l970s, several changes occurred in the economics and technol- 
ogy  of  the  industry. Perhaps most important was  that  production  of  chips 
moved  from  large  scale  integration (LSI)  to  very  large  scale  integration 
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capital-intensive. Estimates for building a world-class production facility var- 
ied, but most analysts concurred that the cost had risen some ten- to twenty- 
fold from 1975 to 1985. By 1990, every step in the production process became 
more capital intensive, expensive, and intricate. A high-volume plant cost ap- 
proximately $400 million and would take almost two years to build and qualify 
the products for sale. Learning effects were also significant, with costs declin- 
ing about 30-40  percent for every doubling of production. One estimate sug- 
gested that a firm had to achieve 6 percent of  the world market (up from 3 
percent a decade earlier) from each new plant in order to justify the capital 
costs. R&D expenses also rose during this period, averaging as much as 15 
percent of sales in some years. As product life cycles in the industry shortened 
on some high-volume products (like DRAMS) from five to three years, the 
advantage was won by firms that introduced early and had the capacity to fill 
demand (Yoffie 1988). 
These features of the semiconductor industry make it an ideal-typical candi- 
date for strategic trade policy, especially in the context of growing economic 
blocs. The largest part of demand for semiconductors is in the United States 
and Japan (approximately 39 percent and 51 percent, respectively, in  1989), 
with Europe consuming approximately 10 percent. No individual country in 
Europe had adequate demand to justify new plant capacity. Once Europe be- 
comes a larger bloc, however, the incentives for more semiconductor produc- 
tion are obvious. A European government could hypothetically intervene in its 
semiconductor industry, reduce imports, and build local scale economies. Eu- 
rope might then receive a disproportionate share of the benefits from the profits 
or spillovers generated by the semiconductor industry. And while capital mo- 
bility allows firms to move abroad easily in industries that broadly conform 
with the competitive paradigm, the capital-intensive and especially the R&D- 
intensive nature of semiconductors makes it much harder for firms to escape 
from a high-cost national base in the short to medium run, or for firms to invest 
directly in a foreign market to avoid import tariffs. 
The incentive to protect semiconductors  in Europe becomes even more com- 
pelling if one looks at the history of this industry. In the early 1970s, America 
dominated production and consumption-controlling  over 60 percent of both. 
To build a competitive industry, the Japanese government explicitly and im- 
plicitly restricted foreign entry until the late 1970s. Even though many studies 
suggested that protectionism led to initially higher costs for Japanese produc- 
ers, by the end of the period, Japanese firms successfully built scale economies, 
moved down the learning curve, and had become the lowest-cost producers in 
the world of  certain leading-edge chips. The temptation for any  individual 
country in Europe to replicate the Japanese experience should be low because 
even Germany and France have tiny markets for chips compared to Japan and 
the United States. But collectively, Europe’s market for chips in the 1990s is 
only marginally smaller than Japan’s market in the early 1970s. 
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semiconductors, but  the high  fixed cost structure of manufacturing  and the 
scale intensity of  R&D make it difficult for firms to adapt to protectionism. 
Trade conflict between the United States and Japan in semiconductors has been 
intense since the mid- 1980s. In other industries with comparable trade conflict, 
like TVs in the 1970s and autos in the  1980s, many Japanese firms invested 
heavily in the United States within a few years. But direct investment in semi- 
conductors has been much slower; most firms in Japan (and the United States) 
have considered the cost penalties too great to move either the high value- 
added portion of manufacturing (i.e., wafer fabrication versus assembly  and 
test) or large R&D facilities (many firms have small design centers in other 
countries where marginal changes  are made in  the home country  designs). 
Even though protectionism was a reality in Japan throughout the  1970s and 
became a real threat in America and Europe in the mid-l980s, few plants actu- 
ally moved overseas. Most companies that have announced their intentions to 
pursue direct investment will not be opening facilities in other countries until 
the mid- 1990s (see table 4.1). Furthermore, most of the planned facilities are 
only manufacturing operations, without fully integrated R&D. Most firms con- 
tinue to do the significant R&D at home and transfer designs to foreign plants. 
While we do not yet know how trade, investment, and protectionism in semi- 
conductors will evolve, experience to date is suggestive of several issues posed 
in our model. First, the Europeans have already showed signs of creating a 
fortress in semiconductors, even before the  1992 program was complete. Re- 
cent changes in antidumping laws (which had previously defined local content 
in chips as low value-added assembly and test, but now defines local content 
as “diffusion” or fabrication) have been widely interpreted within the industry 
as a sign that Europe wants to safeguard European chip demand for European 
companies. Second, the high cost of direct investment in an industry like semi- 
conductors makes it harder for firms to adjust. The very slow pace of direct 
investment is evidence of this trend. But third, even if domestic firms do not 
like to move abroad their increasing returns activities, one should expect capi- 
tal to move if it becomes a necessity for being competitive. It may take a much 
longer time, and not all of the increasing returns activities may relocate, but 
ultimately capital remains mobile. If firms penetrate each others’ markets, and 
assuming that investment  is not a perfect  substitute for trade, the domestic 
incentives for protection could decline. 
4.4  Implications 
Thus far we have argued that strategic trade policies in a world with larger 
trading blocs will differ greatly across sectors. Incentives for protection will 
be greater and last longer in industries with increasing returns in production 
compared to industries that lack significant scale economies. For those goods 
that are not subject to increasing returns, the formation of large trading blocs 
may ultimately help lower tariffs, as firms quickly move production abroad. 145  Trading Blocs and the Incentives to Protect 
Table 4.1  Overseas Semiconductor  Fabrication Facilities, Memory 
and Microprocessors 
Company  Date  Location 
Capacity 
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Table 4.1  (continued) 
Company  Date  Location 
Capacity 
Product  (per month) 
Mijo, Japan 
Mijo, Japan 
1991  Ibaragi,  Japan 
1990  Italy 
1990  W.  Germany 
1992  Italy 
1991  Taiwan 
1995  Taiwan 
256K DRAM, 1M DRAM, 
256K SRAM 
256K DRAM 














Source: Compiled from Dataquest Newsletters. 
For those goods that are subject to increasing returns, however, firms may actu- 
ally  become  more  efficient producers  by  locating  production  exclusively 
within the protected domestic market. Since the presence of increasing returns 
can lead the domestic economy as a whole to benefit from protection, the in- 
centives to raise trade barriers increase in a world dominated by  large trading 
blocs. 
Yet  over time, capital remains mobile, even in sectors with increasing re- 
turns. And to the extent that foreign direct investment occurs, and as long as it 
is an imperfect substitute for trade, it should diminish the force of increasing 
returns-based arguments for domestic protection. Foreign firms with local pro- 
duction (and local employment) will advocate liberalization. Moreover, one of 
the most important strategic advantages of protection to domestic firms disap- 
pears-the  guarantee of  a large domestic market base on which efficient pro- 
duction can be realized. If foreign producers invest in-and  ultimately share- 
the domestic market, trade protection may not be a fully credible guarantee of 
market share. Without credibility, many of the strategic advantages to protec- 
tion are lost. While strategic protection may provide some local employment, 
it may or may not provide the type of employment (e.g., semiconductor R&D) 
or spillovers that would be generated by domestically headquartered firms (see 
Tyson 1992; Porter 1990; Reich 1990). 
To reap the strategic advantages associated with increasing returns, govern- 
ments would need to insulate their economies from foreign direct investment 
and from foreign trade. Yet many countries (or blocs) actively protect certain 
sectors from imports but do not discourage foreign direct investment in those 
sectors. This suggests that either the motivation for protection is different than 
the assumptions underlying our model, or that trade and investment policies in 
many countries are not in harmony with one another. 
One could draw an optimistic conclusion about the world economy from 
this disjunction between direct investment and trade. On the one hand, we have 
argued that growing economic blocs could produce more economic conflict in 
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countries will have  incentives to liberalize trade. Even in increasing returns 
sectors, the mobility of  capital will make it difficult for the European bloc 
or American bloc to preserve its domestic market for local firms. Over time, 
multinational companies will invest in each others’ markets, undermining the 
effectiveness of strategic protectionism. 
In reality, much of this process is already under way. In traditional sectors, 
such as autos, significant foreign investment has already taken place. A Honda 
produced in Ohio is difficult to distinguish from a Honda produced in Japan; 
one suspects the same will be true in Europe when Japanese firms bring their 
announced investments on stream. In the absence of restrictions on local in- 
vestments, it becomes increasingly difficult for governments in  Europe or 
North America to preserve the local market for local companie~.~  The level of 
cross-investment among industrial markets has reached historic proportions, 
partly in response to existing protectionism, and partly in anticipation of  the 
short-run protectionism our model suggests. 
If  the cross-investment described above were symmetrical (i.e., each bloc 
invested roughly equally in each others’ territory), one might predict that pro- 
tectionism and strategic trade policy in a tripolar world might eventually disap- 
pear. Each bloc would have so much of each other’s investment that it would 
be politically difficult to distinguish national origins of firms. While the out- 
flow of investment has been fairly symmetrical across the three blocs (see fig- 
ures 4.5 and 4.6), however, it has been highly asymmetrical on the inflow side. 
Japan appears to be the only major industrialized country whose domestic mar- 
ket remains effectively protected from foreign investment as well as trade in 
some increasing returns sectors. While there are no formal barriers to foreign 
direct investment into Japan (restrictions were removed in the  1970s), Japan 
permits far less foreign access to corporate control than it does even to its 
goods markets.s Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the flows of foreign direct investment 
out of and into major countries, including Japan. Even in an era in which for- 
eign direct investment around the world has mushroomed, inflows into Japan 
remain nil. 
If increasing returns are important, Japan may be the only country that has 
pursued policies that are consistent with maximizing domestic welfare (either 
on purpose or by  happenstance). In the presence of  increasing returns, these 
policies also lower the rest of the world’s welfare. Nevertheless, viewed in this 
way, Japanese policies are not hard to understand. 
The possibility that Japan follows a coherent strategic trade policy has not 
4. If there are going to  be political consequences  of direct investment, it is important that invest- 
ment  is not a perfect substitute for trade. In  the extreme case, where trade and investments are 
substitutes, there is no reason to believe that the foreign firm will lobby for liberalization. Once 
established, the multinational might prefer to continue operating behind closed barriers. In reality, 
however, much of the  investment among industrial countries has been to promote incremental 
sales without displacing all exports from the home country. Therefore, many foreign investors are 
likely to advocate freer trade. 
5. See Froot (1991) for an  analysis of Japanese foreign direct investment. 148  Kenneth A. Froot and David B. Yoffie 
$millions 
50,000 I 
(10,000)  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1973  1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987 
Japan  US.  U.K.  ALLOTHER  -  - - - - -  -  -  -  - 
Fig. 4.5  Foreign direct investment outflows 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Survey of  Current Business, Bank of  England, 
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Fig. 4.6  Foreign direct investment inflows 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Survey of  Current Business, Bank of  England, 
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been  lost on  multinational corporations in increasing returns industries. In 
businesses  like telecommunications equipment, firms based in Europe and 
America fear a repeat of Japan’s performance in semiconductors. The strategy 
of  companies like AT&T may be symptomatic of  the coming battles for in- 
creasing return sectors in East Asia. Below we briefly describe the dynamics 
of  trade and investment strategies in telecommunications equipment. While 
the information is still anecdotal, it suggests that concern over a Japanese trad- 
ing bloc is real and that it is motivating changes in corporate behavior that 
could influence the structure of competition in the region.6 
Central-office switches (COSs) form the heart of the public telecommunica- 
tions network. For most equipment manufacturers, large digital switches are 
the flagship products of their entire equipment line. Physically, a digital COS 
consists of  arrays of  several hundred circuit boards, containing thousands of 
integrated circuits, wired together in metal cabinets of 400 to 1,000 cubic feet. 
Digital COSs range in size from 5,000 line units to more than 100,000 lines 
(connecting remote modules up to forty or fifty miles away). Switches were 
also highly differentiated products, which could be segmented by differences 
in size and degree of functionality. Ericsson switches, for instance, were origi- 
nally designed for international markets and were traditionally more vanilla- 
like-that  is, adaptable but simple, and deployable in relatively small incre- 
ments. At the other extreme, AT&T switches, such as the SESS, were designed 
for a more advanced network, with  larger concentrated volumes of  usage, 
greater functionality (especially centrex), and extraordinary levels of  relia- 
bility. 
The R&D costs for COSs are large, and for the generic software, continuing. 
Only companies with considerable financial resources and technical personnel, 
or substantial government support, have entered this business. Fewer still sur- 
vived the 1980s. In addition to initial development costs, which range from 
$800 million to more than $1 billion for each manufacturer’s switch, there are 
annual expenses for software modifications of  as much as $200 million per 
firm. To recover costs of this magnitude, most firms had to receive government 
subsidies (directly through transfers or indirectly through high domestic switch 
prices), or they had to win a significant share of their domestic markets as well 
as some share of the world market beyond their national borders. If a firm in a 
small country, such as GPT in the United Kingdom, could not sell overseas, its 
ratio of R&D to sales would inevitably become unsustainable without govern- 
ment subsidies, even with a monopoly at home.’ 
Manufacturing COSs also required very large scale plants. Although simple 
assembly can be done locally on a small scale, firms that manufacture their 
circuit boards and integrated circuits require large facilities. In the largest na- 
tional market-the  United States-the  dominant supplier (AT&T) produces 
6. This short case study is based on extensive interviews with AT&T and the other major tele- 
communications equipment companies worldwide. The  full results are reported in Vietor  and 
Yoffie (1993). 
7. Ultimately, GPT had to sell out to Siemens (Cowley 1990). 150  Kenneth A. Froot and David B. Yoffie 
Fig. 4.7  Regional COS market shares 
Note: Other in the United States consists of  Siemens/Stromberg, Ericsson, and NEC; 
Fujitsu is also trying to enter. Other in Europe consists primarily of ItalTel/AT&T, 
Bosch, and TeDeWe. Other in Japan consists of Hitachi, Oki, and Northem Telecom. 
all its SESS switches at a single plant and its 4ESS (interexchange) switches 
at a single plant. Northern Telecom similarly produces its DMS switch at sin- 
gle plants in the United States. Since all other markets are smaller, one can 
assume that efficient manufacturing  scale for digital COSs is a single plant 
with capacity of as much as 6.5 million lines. Under this assumption, the 1989 
world market of 40 million lines could support at most six players, if equally 
sized, at efficient manufacturing scale. In sum, this is a classic increasing re- 
turns business, where the advantages of strategic trade policy should be appar- 
ent to all parties. 
The strategies of firms in this industry are depicted in figures 4.7  and 4.8. 
National firms dominate their home markets. In addition, the American firms 
are aggressively pursuing pieces of Europe, the European and Japanese firms 
are aggressively pursuing the United States, but most of the non-Japanese play- 
ers have given up or forgone opportunities to sell in Japan. Real or imagined 
barriers, technical and political, have discouraged all of the major players (ex- 
cept Northern Telecom, which has less than  1  percent of the Japanese COS 
market) from selling or investing in the Japanese market. 
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Fig. 4.8  Geographic thrusts in telecommunications 
AT&T is particularly interesting in this regard. Starting in the mid-l980s, 
AT&T pursued a strategy of aggressive expansion into Europe and Japan. Its 
goal was to generate 25 percent of its revenues from non-US. sales. Recogniz- 
ing its lack of international experience, AT&T launched a patchwork of “strate- 
gic alliances,” one with Philips, the Dutch electronics giant, to help AT&T 
break into Europe’s COS market; and a variety of distribution and joint venture 
manufacturing agreements were signed throughout Asia, including joint ven- 
tures in Korea and Taiwan for COSs, and two agreements in Japan-including 
a distribution arrangement with Toshiba for PBXs. 
Japan and Asia were a major focus from the beginning. With NEC and Fu- 
jitsu each investing more than $500 million in manufacturing and software 
development for the U.S. market, AT&T management saw penetrating the Jap- 
anese market as a necessity. However, Japan’s NTT, after considerable pressure 
from the United States, rejected the AT&T 5ESS switch. NTT decided to take 
on only one additional outside supplier, giving Northern Telecom a $650 mil- 
lion contract over five years. Toshiba also decided to develop and market its 
own PBX directly in competition with AT&T. At this point, AT&T’s manage- 
ment concluded that it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to challenge 
Japanese suppliers at home. To counter the possible advantages gained by its 
Japanese competitors, AT&T concluded that every effort must be made to stop 
Japan from building a larger protected arena in East Asia. The joint ventures 
in Taiwan and Korea took on new importance, and AT&T decided to contest 
aggressively every new contract in Asia. 
When Indonesia and Malaysia opened bidding for digital switches in 1990 
and  1991, AT&T’s responses were indicative of its strategy. Even though it 
would ship its initial products  to Indonesia from  its subsidiary in Holland 
rather than the United  States, AT&T politicized the contract to the highest 
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levels of  the American government. It mobilized the U.S. government and es- 
pecially the U.S. embassy in Jakarta in an effort to offset any influence of the 
Japanese government on behalf of the other major contender-NEC.  A senior 
Indonesian official claims that “everyone is trying to push, pull, do this, do 
that” (WuU Street Journal, June 21,  1990). Ultimately Indonesia decided to 
double the size of  the contract and give half to NEC and half to AT&T.  A 
similar pattern was being repeated in Malaysia in late 1991: this time it was 
Fujitsu and AT&T going head to head (WuU Street Journal, October 11, 1991). 
The logic of AT&T’s strategy is consistent with the logic of our paper. With 
Japanese and European firms investing aggressively in AT&T’s home market, 
the possibilities of strategic trade intervention in COSs becomes increasingly 
problematic for the United States. While AT&T has been able to counter the 
challenge of a European bloc, to a limited extent, by winning big contracts in 
Italy and Spain, it failed at penetrating Japan. AT&T’s  solution has been to 
attack the periphery of Japan to reduce the long-run Japanese advantage. The 
other major non-Japanese firms-Siemens,  Northern Telecom, Alcatel, and 
Ericsson-have  followed variations on this strategy. 
This analysis suggests two conclusions. First, if  firms in other increasing 
returns industries see Japan as a closed market, then East Asia may well be- 
come the next battleground for trade and investment. Second, we have to won- 
der about the stability of  these arrangements when Japan seems to be in a 
position to follow coherent strategic policies, while the other blocs are politi- 
cally confounded by  cross-investment. Even with growing trade and invest- 
ment by European and American firms in East Asia in increasing returns sec- 
tors, the ongoing asymmetry in direct investment between Japan and the rest 
of the world makes the outlook uncomfortable, at best. 
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Comment  MXCUS  Noland 
Kenneth Froot and David Yoffie have written an interesting and provocative 
paper. The paper first constructs a model of  trading blocs based on optimal 
tariff arguments. It is shown that protection will tend to rise with the size of 
the bloc and that foreign direct investment will act as a counterweight to pro- 
tection. This raises several questions. 
First, Kemp and Wan (1976) have shown that, assuming constant returns to 
scale but permitting a very general set of impediments to trade, any welfare- 
maximizing customs union will iteratively expand until it encompasses the 
whole world in a free trade area in the limit. It is unclear why the Froot-Yoffie 
bloc wouldn’t be subject to the same forces. 
One reason that customs unions do not expand forever is that political sys- 
tems are unable to make the necessary compensating transfers. By  the same 
token, in the real world protection appears to be undertaken more often for 
narrow parochial reasons, not for optimal tariff reasons. This suggests that 
blocs could arise as an equilibrium solution in a model of  international trade 
emphasizing transactions costs and the political economy of protection along 
the lines sketched out in Peter Petri’s paper (chap. 1 in this volume). This could 
be a fruitful avenue for investigating bloc formation. 
What this paper does is point to the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
as a counterweight to protection. In the Froot-Yoffie model this occurs because 
the benefits of  optimal trade policies are diluted by  the presence of  foreign 
firms. This consideration must enter into policymakers’ calculations. However, 
a number of recent cases (Brazilian infomatics, European autos) indicate that 
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government officials behave in a more sophisticated (or at least in a more com- 
plicated) way than in the Froot-Yoffie model, restricting FDI as well as trade 
as part of an overall program. 
Nonetheless, I suspect Froot and Yoffie have the impact of  FDI on trade 
policy right, if for somewhat different reasons. Rather than reducing the incen- 
tives to protect because of dilution of benefits in the home country, FDI acts as 
a counterweight to protection by  generating antiprotection lobbying by  firms 
that fear retaliation against their own operations in the foreign target country. 
In other words, FDI creates hostages, and the existence of hostages discourages 
rash actions. In either view, Japan’s distinctive position with regard to inward 
FDI is troubling. 
While the Kemp-Wan argument holds under constant returns, the existence 
of increasing returns sectors gives rise to opportunities for rent shifting that are 
taken up in the second part of  the paper. Here I think there is room for a sig- 
nificant extension. The paper assumes that countries can pursue optimal poli- 
cies without any foreign reaction. I would argue that, as the size of the blocs 
increases (or, in the paper’s terms, as the number of blocs decreases), the likeli- 
hood of retaliation increases. This, it seems to me, is central to the bloc story. 
The United States does not really care if Belgium inflicts its optimal policies 
on the United States; the United States would care (and certainly respond) if 
the whole European Community did. One can envision a first pass in which 
this is treated as a Nash bargaining game. 
Permitting foreign response is important because once one allows for retali- 
ation, my  sense is that the case for activist policies is weakened, due to the 
possibility of  mutually destructive trade wars. Under these circumstances, it 
would seem to me that the optimal policy response is twofold: announce a tit- 
for-tat strategy as a deterrent measure (which is what the United States’ section 
301 and super 301 can do), then try to negotiate some sort of accord to con- 
strain policymakers’ options (which is essentially what GATT does). 
This leads me to the final section of the paper, which consists of a discussion 
of trade in telecommunications  equipment. Because GATT does its job so well, 
the simple tools (tariffs, quotas, subsidies) to implement optimal trade policies 
are unavailable, policymakers are forced to use less traditional instruments, 
and there is a well-developed body of  anecdotal evidence on this point for 
Japan. I would thus interpret the Structural Impediments Initiative talks as an 
attempt to constrain the use of policy tools not already covered under GATT. 
However, a second issue arises with regard to Japan. What if  the trade im- 
pediments do not take the form of  governmental policy, but of private prefer- 
ences. In this case, the natural response would be for foreign firms to form 
strategic alliances with Japanese firms. For example, the dominant tendency 
among innovative U.S. producers was not to go to the U.S. government seeking 
the creation of a bastion market in the United States, but was rather to form 
strategic alliances with foreign firms. 
A question for the authors, then, is whether what is occumng in Japan is 155  Trading Blocs and the Incentives to Protect 
more akin to the traditional bloc formation analyzed in the first part of  the 
paper, or the private alliance game described in the final section. If  it is the 
former, then it would be useful to analyze the interests of  each East Asian 
country in joining each potential bloc. Presumably the developing countries 
have their own interests, and these could conceivably involve siding with one 
bloc on certain issues and with the other on others. Neither part of the paper 
really speaks to this issue. 
If  the contest is more of  a private game, however, this opens up an even 
larger set of issues. We would want to analyze the incentives of  firms to join 
alliances, and what is the proper role of government policy in this situation. 
This in turn raises issues revolving around the definition of national interest 
(when, for example, the interests of putatively national firms and national resi- 
dents diverge, or when the country is home to firms in competing alliances), 
and the structure of interest-group politics. 
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Comment  Jeffry A. Frieden 
This very  useful essay could be expanded to cover the political economy of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) more comprehensively if its approach to FDI 
itself were more complete. The principal gap in the presentation of the authors 
is the implicit notion that it is primarily shareholders of a mother firm who 
benefit from trade barriers that protect one of their foreign affiliates. This is 
incomplete and leads to a somewhat misleading view of the political economy 
of trade policy in the context of FDI. 
It is widely recognized that FDI is mostly about the transfer of technologi- 
cal, management, and marketing skills and assets that are highly specific to an 
industry or a firm. In  this context, while some of  the benefits of  increased 
business for the industry or firm accrue to shareholders, some of them are also 
realized by  workers and managers (or suppliers and customers) whose skills 
and experience are especially important to the firm or industry. 
In fact, industry-specific trade protection is beneficial to all factors of pro- 
duction specific to the industry, whether the factors are owned by locals or by 
foreigners. Workers with skills specific to an industry gain when that industry 
is protected and can be expected to support such protection. FDI does not 
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change this fact; it only changes, if anything, the nationality of the shareholders 
who also gain from protection. 
However, the protectionist rents accruing to an industry can accrue to differ- 
entfims within the industry. In this sense, if a worker has skills specific to a 
particularfirm rather than to an industry as a whole, and if protection draws in 
foreign firms that gamer some or all of the rents from protection, the worker 
might not be better off. 
Put differently, adding FDI to a picture of trade policy formation  simply 
adds a new set offirms that can benefit from protection. We probably should 
expect some of the benefits from protection that go to new foreign firms to go 
to foreigners (shareholders or headquarters personnel of the mother firm), but 
this is not guaranteed: if the inward investment simply substitutes for lost ex- 
port markets, the foreigners might in fact be worse off. In any case, even with 
FDI  it is very likely that many of the benefits from protection will go to local 
people employed by the foreign firm. So  those whose factors are specific to 
the industry as a whole have an incentive to lobby for protection; those whose 
factors are further specific to an existing domestic firm have an incentive to 
lobby for protection and  against inward direct investment. This is simply a 
variant of the more general desire of members of a cartel to reduce the possibil- 
ity of new entrants into the cartelized industry. 
To take an example, protection of the U.S. auto industry should help those 
whose skills can be used in the auto industry generally. Inward direct invest- 
ment in auto manufacture (the “transplant” phenomenon) harms those whose 
fortunes are tied not to the auto industry generally, but to the Big Three Ameri- 
can firms. So  auto parts producers  and their employees who can sell to all 
assemblers will do well and support both protection and free FDI, while man- 
agers and workers with long-term implicit or explicit contracts with domestic 
auto firms will  do less well and will support protection but oppose inward 
direct investment. I believe that this comes relatively close to describing the 
political economy of these issues. 
The introduction of FDI does not eliminate protectionist rents, and probably 
does not reduce them substantially. It may not even have too appreciable an 
impact on the rents  accruing to local residents (or at least this is purely an 
empirical question). But it does change the contours of the groups aided by 
various trade policies in important ways. 